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MUST EMPLOYERS BE COLORBLIND? TITLE VII BARS INTRA-
RACIAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Walker v. Secretary of Treasury, LR.S.,
713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989)
In Walker v. Secretary of Treasury, LR.S.,' the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia expanded the coverage of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)2 to allow a light-
skinned black person to sue her dark-skinned black supervisor for em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of color.3 The Walker decision rep-
resents the first judicial recognition of pure color discrimination under
Title VII.4
Tracy Walker, a light-skinned black person, was an employee of the
Internal Revenue Service.5 Walker's immediate supervisor, Ruby Lewis,
was a dark-skinned black person.6 Walker and Lewis suffered a poor
working relationship from the beginning.7 Walker eventually was termi-
nated from her position upon the recommendation of Lewis, who alleged
that Walker was tardy, lazy, and incompetent, and had a poor attitude.8
Walker believed the actual reason for her termination was, inter alia,9
Lewis' prejudice against light-skinned blacks.' 0
Walker filed suit under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis
of color.' 1 The defendant argued that Title VII provides no relief for
1. 713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66
(1964) [hereinafter Title VIII (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)).
3. 713 F. Supp. at 408.
4. The only other court to address the issue of color discrimination refused to recognize a
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Sere v. Board of Trustees, 628 F. Supp. 1543 (N.D. Ill.
1986); infra notes 54-58.
5. 713 F. Supp. at 404.
6. Id.
7. Id. Walker complained that Lewis scrutinized her behavior more carefully than the behav-
ior of other employees. Id. Walker had gotten along very well with her former supervisor, Ms. Fite,
and had received a favorable recommendation from her. Ms. Lewis, in contrast, frequently disci-
plined Walker for nonexistent or insubstantial problems. Id. Walker had complained to Sidney
Douglas, the district Equal Employment Opportunity program manager for the I.R.S., about Lewis'
treatment of her. Id.
8. Id. Walker was fired two weeks after complaining to the EEO officer. Id.
9. Walker claimed alternatively that the firing was retaliatory. See infra note 11.
10. 713 F. Supp. at 404. The court found evidence that Lewis might have resented white people
and that she may have transferred this resentment to light-skinned black people. Id. at 404-05.
11. Walker also filed a retaliatory discharge claim under Title VII based on her having com-
plained to the EEO officer. Id. at 405. See supra note 7. In addition, Walker alleged that her
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color discrimination and, even if such an action is cognizable, it does not
encompass discrimination by a dark-skinned person against a light-
skinned person. 12 The trial magistrate recommended granting the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment on this issue. 3 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied the
motion and held: Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based
on color between members of the same race. 14
Courts have recognized actions for racial discrimination in the work-
place under two federal statutes. 5 Title VII specifically prohibits em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."' 6 Congress enacted Title VII primarily to protect
termination violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 701. 713 F. Supp. at 405.
12. 713 F. Supp. at 405.
13. Id. Title VII vests United States district courts with jurisdiction over actions brought pur-
suant to the statute. See Title VII § 706(f)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1982). The Walker court
initially referred the matter to a magistrate.
The defendant also requested summary judgment on the retaliation, § 1981, § 1983, and Adminis-
trative Procedure Act claims. 713 F. Supp. at 408-09. See supra note 11.
14. 713 F. Supp. at 408. In addition, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment with respect to the Title VII retaliation claim. Id. The court, however, granted the de-
fendant's motions with respect to the claims under § 1981, § 1983, and the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. Id. at 409. Trial on the Title VII retaliation and color discrimination claims was set for
January 30, 1990.
15. See infra notes 16, 21 and accompanying text.
16. Section 703(a) of Title VII provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Title VII § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
Title VII proscribes two types of discriminatory employment practices: disparate treatment,
which may be individual or systemic, and disparate impact. See Ward's Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 110 S. Ct. 38 (1989) (disparate impact); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775
(1989) (disparate treatment); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (disparate
impact); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (disparate treatment); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (disparate impact). Walker's allegations against Lewis gave
rise to a claim of disparate treatment. See Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 404; supra note 10 and accompa-
nying text.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court stated four ele-
ments of the prima facie case of disparate treatment racial discrimination under Title VII: (I) that
the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) that he applied for and was qualified for a position
with defendant employer; (3) that he was rejected; and (4) that the position remained open and the
defendant continued to seek applications. Id. at 802. The Court ruled that proof of these elements
raises a rebuttable presumption of racial discrimination, which the defendant can overcome only by
offering a nondiscriminatory motive for his action. Id.
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blacks from discrimination by whites.17 In addition, 42 U.S.C. section
1981 generally guarantees freedom from racial discrimination.18 Section
1981 evolved from the Civil Rights Act of 1866,19 which was designed to
protect the rights of former slaves.20 The Supreme Court has interpreted
its language, which grants to "[a]ll persons ... the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts... as is enjoyed by
white persons . . . ," to proscribe racial employment discrimination as
well. 2 Neither statute, however, explicitly defines "race";22 nor does Ti-
17. Congressman Carleton J. King commented that:
Enforced segregation has long deprived the Negro of rights and privileges, which injustice,
are his. In the basic areas of education, employment, housing, and voting, oppressive con-
ditions have prevented him from exercising his full human rights .... The bill does con-
tain features, in my mind, that properly meet the needs and demands of the Negro.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971). In Griggs, the Supreme Court noted that Congress specifically geared the Act toward pro-
tecting against discriminatory practices by whites against blacks. Specifically, the Court found the
congressional purpose behind Title VII was "to achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees . I..." Id. at 429-30. According to the Court, this goal is clear in the language of
the statute. Id. at 429.
18. Section 1981, in pertinent part states: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts.., as is
enjoyed by white citizens ...." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
Although § 1981 does not specifically proscribe "racial" discrimination, the Supreme Court has
found it applicable to all racial discrimination with respect to private and public contracts. See Saint
Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (racial discrimination by private college);
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168, 174 (1976) (racial discrimination by private school). Unlike
Title VII, however, § 1981 does not cover discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, or national
origin. Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 614 (Brennan, J., concurring); Runyon, 427 U.S. at 167; Cf Olson
v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1230 (8th Cir. 1975).
19. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to
effectuate the thirteenth amendment. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S.
375, 387 (1982).
20. 458 U.S. at 387.
21. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); General Bldg. Contractors
Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 424
(1975). The district court in Walker v. Secretary of Treasury, I.R.S., 713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga.
1989), explained that in an employment discrimination case, the same legal elements and facts may
prove either a Title VII or a § 1981 claim. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
22. Modem dictionaries provide an array of definitions for the term "race." In its broadest
sense, "race" is "a family, tribe, people, or nation belonging to the same stock" or "a class or kind of
people unified by community of interests, habits, or characteristics." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 969 (1985). Some definitions of "race" focus on physiological characteristics:
"a division of mankind possessing traits that are transmissible by descent and sufficient to character-
ize it as a distinct human type." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1870
(1986). In addition, "race" has been partitioned into three categories-caucasian, negroid, and mon-
goloid-with several subdivisions. See WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY (2d
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tle VII provide a definition of "color." '23
Although most racial employment discrimination suits involve black
plaintiffs and white defendants,24 the Supreme Court has interpreted
both statutes to protect whites from discriminatory employment prac-
tices. In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.,2" white em-
ployees sued their white employer based on the employer's preferential
treatment of black workers.26 While both black and white employees
had stolen goods from the employer, the employer terminated only the
white employees. In holding that white persons can maintain a Title VII
discrimination claim,2 7 the Court emphasized that Title VII is not lim-
ited by its terms to discrimination against any particular race." In re-
sponse to the section 1981 claim, 29 the Court relied upon the actual
language of the statute, as well as its history, in concluding that it too
protects whites.30
Subsequent courts have struggled to define the term "race" outside the
black and white context. Several courts have considered whether certain
ethnic groups qualify for protection under Title VII or section 1981.31 In
ed. 1970). Cf Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987) (acknowledging
caucasian, negroid, and mongoloid races).
23. "Color," as a description of human skin tone, is generally synonymous with "complexion"
or "tint." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 447 (1986). In addition, "color"
can have racial connotations, referring to "skin pigmentation other than white, characteristic of race
(as of the Negro race) [or] the members of a race or group with such pigmentation." Id. The
perceptive definition of "color" is: "the aspect of the appearance ... that may be described and
specified in terms derivable wholly from one's perceptions." Id.
24. See, eg., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
25. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
26. Id. at 276,
27. Id. at 278-79.
28. Id. See supra note 16. The Court also quoted its prior decision in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). McDonald, 427 U.S. at 273. Although Griggs involved black employees,
the Court there indicated that Title VII proscribes "[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, mi-
nority or majority." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. In addition, the McDonald Court pointed out that the
prima facie case set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which re-
quired proof that the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority, does not limit Title VII's protection
to minorities. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6.
29. 427 U.S. at 286.
30. Id. at 286-87. Unlike Title VII, § 1981 does not specifically prohibit "racial" discrimina-
tion, but rather guarantees to "all persons" the same protection "as is enjoyed by white citizens."
See supra note 18. The Court rejected a mechanical construction of the phrase "white citizens,"
focusing on the statute's application to "all persons." 427 U.S. at 286-87. The legislative history of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the precursor to § 1981, confirmed this broad reading. Id.
31. See generally Kaufman, A Race by Any Other Name: The Interplay Between Ethnicity,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss1/13
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Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,32 the Tenth Circuit considered
whether a Mexican-American employee can state a cause of action for
racial discrimination under section 198 1.3  The employee in Manzanares
alleged that his white coworkers received preferential treatment from the
employer. 34 In recognizing the cause of action, the court rejected an in-
terpretation of section 1981 that would limit "race" to a technical or
restrictive meaning.35 Rather, the court placed Mexican-Americans
within the scope of "all persons," who may be perceived as distinguish-
able from "white citizens" under section 1981.36 The Fifth Circuit, in
Jatoi v. Hurst-Euless-Bedford Hospital Authority,3 7 similarly permitted a
person of East Indian origin to state a claim for relief under section 1981
based on his membership in a group "commonly perceived to be 'racial'
because it is ethnically and physiognomically distinct."3
In contrast, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, in Ibrahim v. New York State Department of Health,39 ruled
that an Arab plaintiff cannot state a cause of action for racial discrimina-
National Origin and Race for Purposes of Section 1981, 28 ARIZ. L. REv. 259 (1986); Annotation,
Applicability of 42 USCS § 1981 to National Origin Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 A.L.R.
FED. 103 (1979).
32. 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979).
33. Id. at 969. The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue on appeal from the trial court's granting
the defendant's motion to dismiss. Id.
34. Id. The plaintiff, a Mexican-American, complained of unlawful employment practices
when his employer, Safeway Stores, discharged him for alleged theft. The plaintiff eventually was
acquitted of the charges and reinstated to his position, but he lost his seniority and did not receive
backpay. In contrast, the employer merely suspended white employees who admitted stealing com-
pany property. Id. The plaintiff categorized himself as a person "of Mexican-American descent"
and the suspended white employees as "Anglos." Id.
35. Id. at 971. The court cited McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)
and Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 424 (1975) for this proposition.
Manzanares, 593 F.2d at 970-71. The court also found the dictionary useful in defining "race" as "a
class of individuals with common characteristics, appearances, or habits." Id. at 971 (citing WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1986)).
36. Id. at 970. According to the Tenth Circuit, § 1981 protects "groups" from being "mea-
sured against the Anglos as the standard." Id. Given the factual circumstances and the geographi-
cal region (the Southwest), the court concluded that the group of Mexican-Americans "is of such an
identifiable nature that the treatment afforded its members may be measured against that afforded
the Anglos." Id.
37. 807 F.2d 1214, reh'g denied, 819 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1987).
38. Id. at 1218. The court rejected the defendant's arguments that § 1981 does not protect East
Indians, who are technically caucasian. Id. (citing Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 802 F.2d 111,
115 (5th Cir. 1986)). Although the plaintiff alleged national origin and alienage discrimination, the
court determined that an Indian may recover for racial discrimination regardless of the characteriza-
tion in the pleadings. Id.
39. 581 F. Supp. 228 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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tion under section 1981. 40 The court reasoned that, because the Arab
ethnic group is not technically a race, section 1981 does not protect
Arabs.41 Rather, the court labeled discrimination against a person of
Arab descent national origin discrimination, which section 1981 does not
proscribe.42
In Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji,43 the Supreme Court resolved
the dispute over ethnicity by granting an Iraqi plaintiff protection from
racial discrimination under section 1981.' The plaintiff in Saint Francis,
a college professor, claimed that a white administrator at the college de-
nied his request for tenure because he was an Arab." Although the
Court noted that, under modem precepts, an Arab is a member of the
caucasian race,46 the Court looked to the definition of "race" prevalent
40. Id. at 232. The plaintiff in Ibrahim alleged that the defendant failed to promote him to a
fiscal analyst position based on his age, race, and national origin in violation of Title VII and 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Id. at 230.
41. Id. at 231.
42. Id. See also Anooya v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 733 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1984) (§ 1981 does not
protect Iraqi plaintiff); Saad v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 33 (D.D.C. 1978) (discrimi-
nation against Arab not racial discrimination); Budinsky v. Coming Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786
(W.D. Pa. 1977) (Slav not protected by Title VII). Cf. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 785 F.2d
523 (4th Cir. 1986) (Jews are not a "racially distinct group" for purposes of racial discrimination
under § 1982), rev'd, 481 U.S. 615 (1987). In Shaare Tefila, the Fourth Circuit specifically ignored
the fact that the defendants perceived Jews to be racially distinct. 785 F.2d at 526-27.
43. 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
44. Id. at 613.
45. Id. at 606. Al-Khazraji alleged discrimination on the basis of religion, national origin,
and/or race. He sued under, inter alia, Title VII and § 1981. Id. The district court dismissed the
Title VII claim as barred by Pennsylvania's statute of limitations, but permitted the § 1981 claim for
racial discrimination. Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 523 F. Supp. 386, 388, 390 (W.D. Pa.
1981). Subsequently, on defendant's motion for summary judgment, the district court held that
plaintiff alleged only religious and national origin discrimination and, alternatively, even if he alleged
racial discrimination, § 1981 does not protect persons of Arabian descent. Al-Khazraji v. Saint
Francis College 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1302 (W.D. Pa. 1985). On appeal, the Third
Circuit held that, because Al-Khazraji alleged his "membership in a group that is ethnically and
physiognomically distinctive," he may state a racial discrimination claim under § 1981. Al-Khazraji
v. Saint Francis College 784 F.2d 505, 517 (3d Cir. 1988).
46. 481 U.S. at 610 n.4, 613. According to the Court, "[t]here is a common popular under-
standing that there are three major races-Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid." Id. at 610 n.4.
See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1484 (2d ed. 1970) ("many ethnol-
ogists now consider that there are only three primary divisions, the Caucasian (loosely, white race),
Negroid (loosely, black race), and Mongoloid (loosely, yellow race)") (emphasis in original). The
Court, however, seemed hesitant to accept this tripartite division as the controlling modem defini-
tion of "race." See 481 U.S. at 610 n.4 (noting the arbitrariness of racial classifications and "[cI]lear-
cut categories") (citing numerous biologists and anthropologists).
Using this three-part definition of "race," the defendants argued that an Arab is a member of the
caucasian race, and § 1981 does not cover discrimination claims between caucasians. Id. at 609-10.
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when Congress enacted section 1981.4 Citing nineteenth century dic-
tionaries" and excerpts from the legislative history,4 9 the Court deter-
mined that ethnicity or ancestry may serve as the basis for a section 1981
claim. O According to the Court, the statute protects a person who "'is
genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive sub-
grouping of homo sapiens.'",1  In addition, the Court indicated that a
"distinctive physiognomy" is not necessary to state a claim for relief
under section 1981.52
Most lower court decisions preceding Saint Francis involved racial dis-
The college distinguished McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), in which
the Court allowed white workers to sue their white employer, because McDonald involved preferen-
tial treatment of blacks. Id. at 609. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
47. 481 U.S. at 610-13. As the Court stated, "[p]lainly, all those who might be deemed Cauca-
sian today were not thought to be of the same race at the time § 1981 became law." Id. at 610. At
least one commentator has noted that the Court's reliance on contemporary sources is misplaced,
given that the statute's ultimate authority lies in the thirteenth amendment. See Note, Redefining
Race in Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb: Using Dic-
tionaries Instead of the Thirteenth Amendment, 42 VAND. L. REV. 209, 221 (1989) [hereinafter Note,
Redefining Race].
48. The Saint Francis Court found numerous dictionaries and encyclopedias dating from 1830
to 1887 that support a broad definition of "race" relating to stock, lineage, or ancestry. Saint Fran-
cis, 481 U.S. at 610-11. According to the Court, "[i]t was not until the 20th century that dictionaries
began referring to the Caucasian, Mongolians, and Negro races, or to race as involving divisions of
mankind based upon different physical characteristics." Id. at 611 (citations omitted).
49. Because § 1981 evolved from the Voting Rights Act of 1870 and the Civil Rights Act of
1866, see supra note 19 and accompanying text, the Court examined the congressional debates of
these acts. 481 U.S. at 612-13. Statements of individual legislators convinced the Court that "race"
includes Scandinavians, Chinese, Latins, Spanish, Anglo-Saxons, Jews, Mexicans, Blacks,
Mongolians, Germans, and Gypsies. Id. at 612. For an argument that the Court may have taken
statements out of context, see Note, Redefining Race, supra note 47, at 215 & n.47.
50. 481 U.S. at 613. For a discussion and criticism of this holding, see Kaufman & Schwartz,
Civil Rights in Transition: Sections 1981 and 1982 Cover Discrimination on the Basis of Ancestry and
Ethnicity, 4 ToURo L. REV. 183 (1988); Note, Redefining Race, supra note 47; Comment, Saint
Francis College v. A1-Khazraji: Cosmetic Surgery or a Fresh Breadth for Section 1981?, 16 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 77 (1988); Comment, Discrimination-Ancestry--An Unpersuasive Expansion of
42 U.S.C. Section 1981 to Include Discrimination Based on Ancestry, Saint Francis College v. Majid
Ghadon AI-Khazraji, 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 197 (1988).
51. 481 U.S. at 613 (quoting the Third Circuit opinion, 784 F.2d 505, 517 (1986)).
52. Id. According to the Court, AI-Khazraji would state a § 1981 claim by proving, on re-
mand, "that he was subjected to intentional discrimination based on the fact that he was born an
Arab .... Id.
The Court emphasized, however, that a claimant must prove that the basis of the discrimination
was ethnicity, rather than religion or national origin. Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan
pointed out the difficulty in legally distinguishing ancestry, which falls under the rubric of racial
discrimination, and national origin, which is not covered by § 1981. Id. at 614 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). As Brennan explained, ancestry and national origin may be "identical as a factual matter."
Id. Moreover, the two concepts "overlap as a legal matter" under Title VII. Id.
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crimination claims predicated on ethnicity or ancestry. s3 In Sere v.
Board of Trustees, 4 however, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois addressed for the first time discrimination
on the basis of color. In Sere, a Nigerian black employee claimed that his
American black supervisor, who had lighter skin, discriminated against
him because of his darker color.55 The court held that color-based dis-
crimination is not actionable under section 1981.56 Although the court
recognized the possibility that intra-racial color discrimination may ex-
ist,5 7 it was reluctant to engage in "the unsavory business of measuring
skin color." '
The United States -District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,
in Walker v. Secretary of Treasury,59 became the first court to recognize a
discrimination claim based on color. Relying primarily on the Saint
Francis decision, 60 the court held that a light-skinned black employee
may state a cause of action under Title VII against her dark-skinned
black supervisor.6
53. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
54. 628 F. Supp. 1543 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
55. Id. at 1546.
56. Id. See also Waller v. International Harvester Co., 578 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Il1. 1984). In
Waller, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois refused to recognize a
black plaintiff's cause of action for color discrimination under § 1981, which applies only to race
discrimination. Id. at 314. The employee had complained of disparate treatment in the promotion
and job classification process. However, in Vigil v. City and County of Denver, 15 EmpL. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) f 8000 (D. Colo. 1977), the court allowed a Mexican-American to bring a claim based on
color discrimination. In determining that § 1981 applied to cases of color discrimination, the court
remarked that "skin color may vary significantly among individuals, who are considered 'blacks' or
'whites'." Id. 1 8000. Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ac-
knowledged the possibility of a Puerto Rican plaintiff's color discrimination claim. Felix v. Mar-
quez, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 31,279 (D.D.C. 1980). Although the court recognized
widespread color-based discrimination in Puerto Rico, it noted that color discrimination cases are
rare because they usually are mixed with race discrimination claims. Still, the court disagreed with
the defendant's general assertion that color discrimination is not a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Id. 1 31,279.
57. The court found that color-based discrimination may exist among members of the same
race, but held that the plaintiff did not establish that such discrimination formed a basis for recovery
under § 1981. 628 F. Supp. at 1546.
58. The court remarked, "[tihis court refuses to create a cause of action that would place it in
the unsavory business of measuring skin color and determining whether the skin pigmentation of the
parties is sufficiently different to form the basis of a lawsuit." Id.
59. 713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
60. See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
61. 713 F. Supp. at 408. The court noted that "Title VII is the exclusive remedy for federal
employment discrimination law suits." Id. at 405 (citing Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820 (1976)).
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In Walker, the court rejected the employer's argument that under Title
VII, color is synonymous with race.62 Because the elements for estab-
lishing claims under Title VII and section 1981 are identical,63 the court
first analyzed the legislative intent of section 1981. 6' Citing Saint Fran-
cis, the court found that Congress intended section 1981 to protect
against ancestral and ethnic discrimination.65 In particular, the court
emphasized the Supreme Court's statement that a claim of racial dis-
crimination does not require distinctive physical characteristics.66 The
court thus concluded that, because "[a] person's color is closely tied to
his ancestry," color can engender perceptions that the Saint Francis
Court recognized as actionable under section 1981.67
In addition, the Walker court specifically addressed the scope of Title
VII. The court interpreted the plain meaning and purpose of the statute
as evidence that race and color are not synonymous.68 The court also
noted that the Supreme Court has referred repeatedly to the protection
from discrimination based on race and color.69 Based on the statutory
language and judicial interpretation of Title VII, the court decided that,
62. Id. The defendant argued that the term "color" in Title VII "has generally been inter-
preted to mean the same thing as race." Id. (quoting Defendant's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment at 8).
The defendant specifically relied on two decisions, Felix v. Marquez, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1
31,279 (D.D.C. 1980) and Vigil v. City and County of Denver, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8000 (D.
Colo. 1977), to support its argument. See supra note 56. The Walker court, however, interpreted
these cases differently. The court read Felix as recognizing the possibility of a color discriminaiton
claim. The court similarly highlighted the Vigil decision as supportive of its own. In fact, the court
quoted language in Vigil emphasizing that courts should focus on the motive behind discrimination.
713 F. Supp. at 406-07.
63. 713 F. Supp. at 405. (citing Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928 (11th Cir. 1983) and
Caldwell v. Martin Marietta Corp., 632 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1980)). For a discussion of the elements
of a prima facie case under Title VII and § 1981, see supra notes 16, 21 and accompanying text.
64. 713 F. Supp. at 405-06.
65. Id. at 406. The Walker court quoted the Supreme Court's identification of section 198 I's
purpose as "'the protection of citizens of the United States in their enjoyment of certain rights
without discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.'" Id. at 405
(quoting McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (emphasis added by court)).
66. Id. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
67. The Walker court stated that, because it is linked to ancestry, a person's color "could result
in his being perceived as a 'physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens,' which in
turn could be the subject of discrimination." Id. (quoting Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 613).
68. Id. Relying on prior Supreme Court decisions, the court identified Title VII's purpose as
assuring equal employment opportunities by eradicating discriminatory treatment "on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (emphasis added by court)).
69. Id. at 405.
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unless Congress and the Supreme Court acted redundantly, "'race' is to
mean 'race', and 'color' is to mean 'color'. 70
The court in Walker also refuted the employer's argument that, even if
a color discrimination claim is cognizable, Title VII does not protect a
light-skinned person from discrimination by a dark-skinned member of
the same race.71 Because the Court in Saint Francis recognized distinc-
tions among members of the caucasian race,72 the Walker court reasoned
that it should similarly acknowledge distinctions among blacks. As the
court stated, "[i]t would take an ethnocentric and naive world to suggest
that we can divide caucasians into many sub-groups but some how [sic]
all blacks are part of the same sub-group.
73
Although the Walker court acknowledged the Illinois district court's
concern in Sere74 that allowing color discrimination claims would create
difficulties for courts in measuring differences in skin pigmentation,75 it
rejected this as a valid basis for denying a cause of action.76 The court
instead deemed color differentiation an appropriate question for the
factfinder.77
The Walker court correctly held that a light-skinned black employee
may bring a cause of action under Title VII against a dark-skinned black
employer. On first inspection, however, the court's reliance on Saint
Francis appears misplaced in two respects. Only through a careful re-
analysis of Walker's implications can one justify the result doctrinally.
First, the court in Walker ignored that Saint Francis involved a race dis-
crimination claim rather than a claim based on color.78 Had Walker al-
leged racial discrimination, the court appropriately might have relied on
70. Id. at 406.
71. Id. at 407. The Walker court treated this argument in essentially the same manner as the
defendant's first argument.
72. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
73. 713 F. Supp. at 407-08. The court pointed out that "[tihere are sharp and distinctive con-
trasts among native black African peoples (sub-Saharan) both in color and in physical characteris-
tics." Id. at 408.
74. Sere v. Board of Trustees, 628 F. Supp. 1543 (N.D. Ill. 1986). See supra notes 54-58 and
accompanying text.
75. 713 F. Supp. at 408. The court characterized the difficulty in differentiating skin color as
"genuine and substantial." Id. (citing Sere, 628 F. Supp. at 1546).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See supra notes 11, 45 and accompanying text. The Walker court found Saint Francis "the





Saint Francis without explaining the difference. Instead the court ap-
peared summarily-and disingenuously-to link race and color.
Second, the Supreme Court in Saint Francis interpreted section 1981,
rather than Title VII.7 9 In doing so, the Court broadened the definition
of "race" to its nineteenth century meaning."0 The Walker court, having
found the elements under both statutes "identical,""1 concluded that
Saint Francis "definitively" 2 resolved the Title VII issue. This compari-
son disregards the more limited definition of "race" that the Saint Fran-
cis Court recognized as controlling in modem society 83-the time period
in which Congress enacted Title VII. 4 By forgetting the potentially dif-
ferent meanings of "race" under section 1981 and Title VII, the Walker
court seemed to compare apples and oranges.
Notwithstanding these inconsistencies, the decision in Walker likely
involved greater insight than first appears. Title VII defines "race" in a
much more limited fashion than does section 1981, but Title VII prohib-
its color discrimination as well. The Walker court may have held implic-
itly that the terms "race" and "color" in Title VII encompass much or
all of section 1981's proscriptions. Thus, the court was not at all disin-
genuous in analogizing the two statutes. While stating that "color"
means "color," the district court undoubtedly recognized the potential
for abuse in allowing Title VII claims based solely on color.8 5  It there-
fore limited the cause of action to discrimination based on perceived eth-
nic or ancestral characteristics, though it left a more thorough drawing
of this line to future courts.8 6
79. See supra notes 11, 44 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
81. 713 F. Supp. at 405.
82. Id. at 406.
83. See supra note 46.
84. Congress enacted Title V1I in 1964, nearly 100 years after the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, upon which § 1981 is based. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
85. See 713 F. Supp. at 408. For example, a claim of pure color discrimination, without ethnic
or racial undertones, would include a claim by a sun-tanned person against a fair-skinned person of
the same race. This is obviously ridiculous, and such an anomalous result is probably not what
Congress intended in enacting Title VII.
86. The court explained in only one sentence the connection between color and racial
perceptions:
A person's color is closely tied to his ancestry and could result in his being perceived as a
'physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens', which in turn could be the
subject of discrimination [although] it is not even required that a victim of discrimination
be of a distinctive physiognomical sub-grouping ....
Id. at 406. Unfortunately, this was all the court said in limiting the cause of action it recognized. It
is not clear that the fact pattern in Walker constitutes a cognizable Title VII claim. The opinion
1990]
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In Walker, the Atlanta district court strove to eliminate disparity
within Title VII's prohibitions by allowing blacks the same right as
whites to claim intra-racial discrimination. While Walker's analysis is
opaque and its limiting principles ill-defined, the court correctly carried
the Saint Francis holding into the broader-reaching Title VII context.
Amy Weinstein
makes clear that the court only disposed of a summary judgment motion by the defendant. Id. at
408. The plaintiff will still have to meet whatever limits the court has placed on her claim.
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